Science in Metaphysics : Exploring the Metaphysics of Properties and Laws
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What, historically, until late in the Twentieth Century, was called the "Humean" account of Laws of Nature was a misnomer. Hume himself was no "Humean" as regards laws of nature. Hume, it turns out, was a Necessitarian — i. His legendary skepticism was epistemological. He was concerned, indeed even baffled, how our knowledge of physical necessity could arise.
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What, in experience, accounted for the origin of the idea? What, in experience, provided evidence of the existence of the property?
He could find nothing that played such a role. Yet, in spite of his epistemological skepticism, he persisted in his belief that laws of nature are physical necessities. So as not to perpetuate the historical error as to what "Humean" properly connotes, I will abandon that term altogether and will adopt the relatively unproblematical term "Regularity" in its stead. There is no physical necessity, either in laws or in nature itself. There is no intermediate state between logical necessity on the one hand and sheer contingency on the other.
Necessitarians , in contrast, argue that there is physical or as they sometimes call it "nomic" or "nomological" necessity. They offer two different accounts. According to some Necessitarians, physical necessity is a property of the Laws of Nature along with truth, universality, etc. Thus, for example, on the first of these two Necessitarian theories, electrons will bear the electrical charge On the second of the two Necessitarian theories, the "necessity" of an electron's bearing this particular electrical charge "resides" in the electron itself.
It is of the very 'nature' of an electron, by necessity, to have this particular electrical charge. On this latter account, the statement "All electrons bear a charge of Regularists and Necessitarians agree as to five conditions necessary for a statement's being a Law of Nature. Categorical claims e. Note: Laws of physics which are expressed mathematically are taken to be elliptical for conditional truths. Regularists say "yes"; Necessitarians, "no". Moas a large flightless bird that lived in New Zealand have been extinct for more than a century.
Suppose it died at the age of n years. Thus the statement "No moa lives beyond the age of n years" is true where "lives" is being used as a tenseless verb. Moreover this statement satisfies all the other necessary conditions specified above. But, Necessitarians will argue, the statement "No moa lives beyond the age of n years" is not a law of nature.
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It is counterintuitive to believe that such a statement could be on the same metaphysical footing as "No perpetual motion machine of the first kind exists", or, citing another example, "No object having mass is accelerated beyond the speed of light". The latter statements are bona fide laws of nature; the former a mere 'accidental' truth.
The difference lies in the alleged fact that the latter two cases about perpetual motion machines and about massy objects are physically necessary truths; the former about moas is a mere accidental truth.
To use Popper's terminology, genuine laws of nature "forbid" certain things to happen; accidental truths do not. Suppose the oldest moa — we'll call him Ludwig — died, of an intestinal infection, at the age of let's say 12 years. I haven't any idea what the average life span of moas was. It's irrelevant for our purposes. Now suppose that Ludwig had a younger brother, Johann, hatched from the same clutch of eggs, one hour later than Ludwig himself. Poor Johann — he was shot by a hunter 10 minutes before Ludwig died of his illness.
But, surely, had Johann not been shot, he would have lived to a greater age than Ludwig. Unlike his very slightly older brother, Johann was in perfect health. Johann was well on his way to surviving Ludwig; it's just that a hunter dispatched him prematurely.
His death was a misfortune; it was not mandated by a law of nature. If those conditions were to constitute a set of sufficient conditions for a statement's being a law of nature, then the statement "No river is constituted of cola" would be a law of nature.
Nature and scope of metaphysics
The oddity goes even more deeply. Given that what it is to be physically impossible is to be logically inconsistent with a law of nature, then every false existential statement of the sort "Some S is P" or "There is an S that is a P" would turn out to be, not just false, but physically impossible. But surely the statement "There is a river of cola", although false, is not physically impossible.
There could be such a river. It would merely require a colossal accident such as befell Boston in when a huge vat of molasses ruptured , or the foolish waste of a great deal of money. If "there is a river of cola" is not to be regarded as physically impossible, then some one or more further conditions must be added to the set of necessary conditions for lawfulness. Physical necessity would seem to be that needed further condition.
Suppose 1 that Earth is the only planet in the universe to have supported intelligent life; and 2 that all life on Earth perished in when the earth was struck by a meteor 10, km in diameter. Clearly, under those conditions, the Wright Brothers would never have flown their plane at Kitty Hawk. Even though tinkerers and engineers had been trying for centuries to build a heavier-than-air motorized flying machine, everyone had failed to produce one.
But their failure was merely failure; these projects were not doomed. Yet, if the universe had had the slightly different history just described, the statement "there is a heavier-than-air motorized flying machine" would turn out to be physically impossible; hence the project was doomed. But, Necessitarians will argue, not all projects that fail are doomed. Some are doomed, e.
Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties - Oxford Scholarship
Again, just as in the case of accidental truths and lawful truths, we do not want to collapse the distinction between doom and failure. Some projects are doomed ; others are mere failures. The distinction warrants being preserved, and that requires positing physical necessity and — what is the other side of the same coin — physical impossibility. With the dawning of the modern, scientific, age came the growing realization of an extensive sublime order in nature.
To be sure, humankind has always known that there is some order in the natural world — e. But until the rise of modern science, no one suspected the sweep of this order. The worldview of the West has changed radically since the Renaissance. From a world which seemed mostly chaotic, there emerged an unsuspected underlying order , an order revealed by physics, chemistry, biology, economics, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, geology, evolutionary theory, pharmacology, epidemiology, etc.
Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties
And so, alongside the older metaphysical question, "Why is there anything, rather than nothing? What accounts for it?
Even as recently as the Eighteenth Century, we find philosophers e. Montesquieu explicitly attributing the order in nature to the hand of God, more specifically to His having imposed physical laws on nature in much the same way as He imposed moral laws on human beings. There was one essential difference, however. Human beings — it was alleged — are "free" to break act contrary to God's moral laws; but neither human beings nor the other parts of creation are free to break God's physical laws. In the Twentieth Century virtually all scientists and philosophers have abandoned theistic elements in their accounts of the Laws of Nature.
But to a very great extent — so say the Regularists — the Necessitarians have merely replaced God with Physical Necessity. The Necessitarians' nontheistic view of Laws of Nature surreptitiously preserves the older prescriptivist view of Laws of Nature, namely, as dictates or edicts to the natural universe, edicts which — unlike moral laws or legislated ones — no one, and no thing, has the ability to violate.